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Abstract
In this paper we examine how model uncertainty due to the preference for robustness (RB)
affects optimal taxation and the evolution of debt in the Barro tax-smoothing model (1979).
We first study how the government spending shocks are absorbed in the short run by varying
taxes or through debt under RB. Furthermore, we show that introducing RB improves the
model’s predictions by generating (i) the observed relative volatility of the changes in tax
rates to government spending, (ii) the observed comovement between government deficits and
spending, and (iii) more consistent behavior of government budget deficits in the US economy.
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1 Introduction
Figure 1 presents the post-war behavior of US government spending, average tax rates, and
government debt. In this paper we ask how to rationalize the joint behavior of these fiscal
variables; specifically, we ask whether the stochastic properties of the joint behavior of these fiscal
variables are consistent with the idea that governments seek to use debt to smooth the taxes
needed to finance an exogenous stream of government spending.
Barro (1979) proposed a simple full-information rational expectations (RE) tax-smoothing
model with only uncontingent debt in which the government spreads the burden of raising distor-
tionary income taxes over time in order to minimize their welfare losses to address these questions.
Specifically, the model predicts that the government should issue debt in order to spread the in-
creases in tax rates over longer periods and minimize the welfare losses when facing a positive
government spending shock.1 Furthermore, the model also predicts that changes in the tax rate
are unpredictable, i.e., the tax rate should follow a random walk.2 It is worth noting that the tax-
smoothing hypothesis (TSH) model is analogous to the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) model
in which consumers smooth consumption over time; tax rates respond to permanent changes in
the public budgetary burden rather than transitory changes.3
Huang and Lin (1993) and Ghosh (1995) went beyond the random-walk tests and use the
analysis of saving in Campbell (1987) to test the restrictions on the joint behavior of budget
deficits and government spending implied by the tax-smoothing hypothesis.4 They found mixed
empirical evidence for the TSH. For example, Huang and Lin (1993) applied a log-linearized TSH
model to the U.S. data from 1929− 1988 and found that the TSH is rejected for the full sample
period, but it is not rejected for the sub-sample period from 1947− 1988. Ghosh (1995) used the
US data from 1961− 1988 and Canadian data from 1962− 1988 and found that the TSH model
cannot be rejected for either country. Cashin (2002) found the TSH is rejected by Pakistan data
for the period 1954− 1995.5 Adler (2006) tested the TSH using the Swedish central government
data and found that it is not possible to statistically reject the TSH for the full period 1952−1999,
but the TSH is rejected using the sub-sample period from 1970− 1996.
1The tax-smoothing model is widely used in the literature to address various fiscal policy issues; see Sahasakul
(1986), Bohn (1990), Trehan and Walsh (1990), Ghosh (1995), Angeletos (2002), Lloyd-Ellis, Zhan, and Zhu (2002),
Aiyagari et al. (2002), and Werning (2006). For the tax-smoothing setting with state-contingent debt, see Lucas
and Stokey (1983), and Karantounias (2013).
2Although Barro (1979, 1981) report that in the US data the prediction that the tax rate is a random walk is
difficult to reject statistically, Sahasakul (1986) is able to reject it.
3For a statement of this equivalence, see Sargent (2001).
4It is well known that it is often difficult to reject the null hypothesis of a random walk for many macroeconomic
time series given the length of the data. Moreover, as argued in Ghosh (1995), the TSH might be only one of many
potential explanations for unpredictable tax rate changes.
5More precisely, the tax-smoothing hypothesis is rejected by a Wald test of the parameter restriction at the 5%
level (as reported in their Table 1).
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However, as shown in Table 3 in the next section, the standard full-information rational expec-
tations (FI-RE) TSH model cannot generate two key stochastic properties of the joint behavior of
government deficits, tax rates, and spending, (i) the relative volatility of changes in tax rates and
spending and (ii) the contemporaneous correlation between government deficits and spending,
in the U.S. economy. Specifically, the model generates too low relative volatility and too high
contemporaneous correlation. As a result, we also find that the TSH is rejected in this standard
full-information RE framework using the US data.
In this paper, we show that model uncertainty due to the preference for robustness (RB)
significantly improves the model’s ability to fit the data discussed above. Hansen, Sargent, and
Tallarini (1999) and Hansen and Sargent (2007) introduced the preference for robustness (a con-
cern for model misspecification) into economic models. In robust control problems, agents are
concerned about the possibility that their true model is misspecified in a manner that is difficult
to detect statistically; consequently, they choose their decisions as if the subjective distribution
over shocks was chosen by an evil agent in order to minimize their utility (that is, the solution
to a robust decision-maker’s problem is the equilibrium of a max-min game between the decision-
maker and the evil agent).6 In other words, the objective of robust control is to design a policy
that can still work well even if the approximating model (i.e., the best estimate of the true model)
does not coincide with the true model. It is worth noting that the key difference between the
RB agent and the Bayesian agent is that the Bayesian agent can form a weight on each model
by combining his priors (over the probability of each model being correctly specified) with the
data, whereas the RB agent does not have the ability to express his beliefs about the models in
terms of well-defined probability distributions.7 In the TSH setting, specifically, the preference
for RB interacts with the fundamental uncertainty (the government spending and output shocks
in the TSH model) and gives rise to a type of induced uncertainty : model uncertainty.8 This
type of induced uncertainty can affect the model’s dynamics even within the linear-quadratic
(LQ) framework.9 We adopt the LQ-TSH setting in this paper because the main purpose of
this paper is to inspect the mechanisms through which the induced uncertainty affects the joint
dynamics of government deficits, tax rates, and spending, and it is much more difficult to study
this informational friction in non-LQ frameworks.10 As argued in Hansen and Sargent (2007),
6Note that the assumption that the government has concerns about having the wrong model for its spending or
taxation policies is not unusual. For instance, U.S. government spending can be affected by economic conditions
and political pressure that is difficult to model and predict.
7See Adam (2010) for a discussion on comparing robust and Bayesian decision-making.
8As shown in Luo and Young (2010), consumption models can still produce precautionary savings but remain
within the class of LQ-Gaussian models, which leads to analytical simplicity.
9Note that in the traditional linear-quadratic, linearized, or log-linearized models, uncertainty measured by the
variance of the fundamental shock does not affect the model dynamics.
10As argued in Hansen and Sargent (2007), if the objective function is not quadratic or the state transition
equation is not linear, worst possible distributions due to RB are generally non-Gaussian, which significantly
complicates the computational task. See Hansen and Sargent (2007) for detailed discussions on the difficulties in
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the government’s commitment technology is irrelevant under RB if the state transition equation
is backward-looking. Therefore, we do not specify the commitment technology of the government
in the TSH model of this paper.11 After solving the model explicitly, we then examine how model
uncertainty due to RB can improve the model’s predictions on the important dimensions of the
joint dynamics of government deficits, tax rates, and spending we discussed above.
We show that the RB model has the potential to generate the observed joint behavior of
government deficits, tax rates, and spending in the US, depending on the parameter governing
the concern for model misspecification. Specifically, we find that incorporating RB enables the
model to better match the data along the two key dimensions: generating higher relative volatility
of changes in tax rates to government spending and lower contemporaneous correlation between
government deficits and government spending. The main mechanisms behind these improvements
rely on the effects of RB on the marginal propensity to taxation based on permanent government
spending and the persistence of the tax and government deficit dynamics, with the key driving
force being the interactions between RB and fundamental shocks. Intuitively, as the government
bears in mind the possible differences between the model it uses and the true model, it not only
encourages the government to set lower tax rates (in order to minimize distortion), but also makes
the government more sensitive to any possible expected changes in spending.
Our benchmark model assumes that there is only a single shock to government spending.
In the extended versions of the model, we also allow for multiple shocks in the government
spending process and a shock to the growth of real GDP. In these two extensions, we show that
the full-information RE model still cannot explain the two key unconditional moments and the
impacts of RB on these moments still hold. Furthermore, after calibrating the RB parameter using
the detection error probability, we find that RB can quantitatively help generate the empirical
stochastic properties of the joint dynamics of government deficits, tax rates, and spending.
In addition to improving the basic model’s ability to match the unconditional moments of
fiscal policy, we are also able to show that the RB model improves the match of conditional
moments; specifically, the RB model can pass the bivariate VAR test used in Huang and Lin
(1993), Ghosh (1995), Adler (2006), and others, provided the desire for robustness is strong
enough. We discipline this desire using detection error probabilities, as advocated by Hansen and
Sargent (2007) and used in Luo, Nie, and Young (2012); the result is that the model passes the
VAR test for reasonable error probabilities using the 1960− 2007 U.S. data.
It is worth noting that our paper is related to the recent literature on optimal fiscal pol-
icy under model uncertainty, e.g., Karantounias (2013) and Svec (2012). Karantounias (2013)
solving the non-LQ RB models, and Bidder and Smith (2011) and Young (2012) for nonlinear approaches that
characterize the worst-case distributions.
11However, in the literature on robust policy, it may be necessary to model commitment technology if the state
transition equation involves expectations. See Kasa (2002) for a discussion on robust policies under commitment
and Giordani and Soderlind (2004) for a discussion on discretion and simple rules under RB.
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examined optimal fiscal policy in the setting of Lucas and Stocky (1983) in which the represen-
tative consumer distrusts the approximating model, and Svec (2012) studied how different types
of government conduct optimal fiscal policy when the consumer faces model uncertainty. Like
Karantounias (2013), we assume that the model uncertainty is incorporated in the government
decision process. Unlike both mentioned papers, the focus of this paper is not to study the opti-
mal fiscal policy; our focus in this paper, though, is to explore how model uncertainty due to RB
helps explain both unconditional and conditional joint behavior of government deficits, tax rates,
and spending observed in the U.S. economy.12
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the standard full-
information rational expectations taxation smoothing model proposed by Barro (1979). Section
3 introduces robustness into the standard TSH model and examines the implications of model
uncertainty due to RB for the joint dynamics of optimal taxation and government debt. Section
4 discusses how to use detection error probabilities to calibrate the robustness parameter and
presents the calibration results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section, we propose a robustness (RB) version of Barro (1979)’s tax-smoothing model and
explore how RB affects optimal taxation and government debt. We assume that the only asset
that is traded internationally is a riskfree bond. In choosing the optimal tax rate, the government
is concerned about model misspecification.
2.1 Taxation Smoothing Hypothesis Problem
In this subsection we present optimal paths of the tax rate and the budget surplus when the
government chooses to minimize the present value of excess burden from taxation given the
stochastic processes of government spending and real GDP. In the absence of a first-best system
of lump-sum taxes, the government must seek to minimize the welfare losses arising from its choice
of tax rates. These losses are assumed to be an increasing, convex, and time invariant function
of the average tax rate. Specifically, following Barro (1979), Roubini (1988), Bohn (1990), Ghosh
(1995), and Lloyd-Ellis, Zhan, and Zhu (2005), we assume that the excess burden of taxation is
summarized by a quadratic loss function c (τt) =
1
2 (τt + ϕ)
2, which measures the value of real
income “wasted” when taxes are τt.
13 The optimization problem of the government can thus be
12There is a vast literature on optimal monetary policy under robustness. See Giannoni (2002), Onatski and
Williams (2003), Giordani and Soderlind (2004), Cogley et al. (2007), Svensson and Williams (2007), Dennis
(2010), Ellison and Sargent (2010), and Woodford (2010).
13Following Barro (1979), Sargent (1987), Bohn (1989), and Huang and Lin (1993), the value of the parameter, ϕ,
in the loss function is set such that the loss function has the standard properties of c′ (τ) > 0 and c′′ (τ) > 0. Note
that the value of ϕ does not affect the stochastic proprties of the joint behavior of the three key fiscal variables.
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written as
max
{τt,bt+1}
E0
[
−1
2
∞∑
t=0
βt (τt + ϕ)
2
]
, (1)
subject to its flow budget constraint
Bt+1 = RBt +Gt − τtYt, (2)
where E0 [·] is the government’s expectation conditional on its information set at time 0, β is the
government’s subjective discount factor, τt is the tax rate, Bt is the amount of government debt,
Gt is government spending, Yt is real GDP, and R ≥ 1 is the gross interest rate.
Suppose that real GDP is growing at a constant rate, n. Then (2) can be rewritten as
(1 + n) bt+1 = Rbt + gt − τt, (3)
where lowercase letters denote corresponding variables expressed as a fraction of real GDP, Yt.
Solving the government’s optimization problem (1) subject to (3) and a no-Ponzi condition yields
the following optimal path for the tax rate:
τt =
(
R− (1 + n)
2
βR
)
Et
bt + 1
R
∞∑
j=0
(
1 + n
R
)j
gt+j
 , (4)
which is just the permanent government expenditures theory proposed by Barro (1979).14 Defining
R˜ = R/ (1 + n) as the effective interest rate faced by the government, (4) can be written as
τt = (1 + n)
(
R˜− 1
βR˜
)
ht, (5)
where
ht = Et
bt + 1
(1 + n) R˜
∞∑
j=0
(
1
R˜
)j
gt+j
 (6)
is permanent government spending, equal to the sum of government debt and the present dis-
counted value of expected government expenditure. This expression is analogous to permanent
income in a standard consumption-savings problem.
Define γ ≡ 1−1/(βR˜
2)
1−1/R˜ . It is clear that γ ≶ 1 iff βR˜ ≶ 1. In the literature, the case in which
βR˜ < 1 (i.e., γ < 1) is called tax tilting.15 In the case in which n = 0 and βR = 1, γ = 1.
Tax smoothing and tax tilting are two main motivations for a government to run budget deficits.
Note that even if government spending (as a fraction of real GDP) is constant over business cycles
such that there is no need for tax-smoothing, budget deficits may still arise due to the tax-tilting
14See Online Appendix 6.1 for the derivation.
15See Ghosh (1995) for a discussion on this topic.
5
motivation to shift (tilt) taxes across time. Specifically, if βR˜ < 1, i.e., the subjective discount
rate of the government is high, the government will choose to have low tax rates early and increase
tax rates over time to finance its accumulated debt. By contrast, if βR˜ > 1, the government will
choose to have relatively high tax rates early and then use accumulated assets (i.e., negative
debts) to reduce tax rates over time. Finally, if βR˜ = 1, then there is no tax-tilting motive
for budget deficits but there would be a strong tax-smoothing motive. Following the literature,
we will focus only on the tax-smoothing motive (i.e., the βR˜ = 1 case) when we examine the
stochastic properties of the joint behavior of government taxes, deficits, and spending. In this
case, the tax function can be written as
τt = (1 + n)
(
R˜− 1
)
ht. (7)
Note that if n = 0, τt = (R− 1)ht and ht = Et
[
bt +
∑∞
j=0R
−j−1gt+j
]
.
As shown in Luo and Young (2010) and Luo, Nie, and Young (2012), in order to facilitate
the introduction of robustness we reduce the above multivariate model with a general exogenous
process to a univariate model with iid innovations that can be solved in closed-form. Specifically,
in the above TSH model, if ht is defined as a new state variable, combining (6) with the original
government budget constraint, we obtain the following new budget constraint:
ht+1 = R˜ht − 1
1 + n
τt +
1
1 + n
ζt+1 (8)
where
ζt+1 =
∞∑
j=0
(
1
R˜
)j+1
(Et+1 − Et) [gt+1+j ] (9)
is the time (t+ 1) innovation to permanent spending. We can thus reformulate the above model
as
v(h0) = max{τt}∞t=0
{
E0
[
−
∞∑
t=0
βtc(τt)
]}
(10)
subject to (8), and v(h0) is the government’s value function under RE.
16
To close the model, we assume that government expenditures evolve according to the following
AR(1) process:
gt+1 = (1− ρg) g + ρggt + t+1, (11)
where ρg ∈ [0, 1] and t+1 is an iid shock with mean zero and variance ω2 . Substituting (11) into
16In the next section, we will introduce robustness directly into this ‘reduced’ TSH model; in the Appendix we
show that the general robust multivariate version delivers the same decision rules because debt evolves determinis-
tically, so that the evil nature cannot distort its law of motion.
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(6) and (9) yields:
ht = bt +
1
(1 + n)
(
R˜− ρg
)gt + (1− ρg) g
(1 + n)
(
R˜− ρg
)(
R˜− 1
) (12)
ζt =
1
R˜− ρg
t. (13)
Therefore, under the full-information RE hypothesis, the change in optimal taxation can be
written as
∆τt =
R˜− 1
R˜
(Et − Et−1)
 ∞∑
j=0
(
1
R˜
)j
gt+j
 (14)
=
R˜− 1
R˜− ρg
t,
which relates the innovation to taxation to government spending shocks. In other words, the
optimal tax rate follows a random walk in the standard rational expectations model. Although
the optimal plan here is to smooth tax rates so that τt = Et [τt+1], it does not mean that τt is
unaffected by the government spending shock; rather, the optimal tax behavior is to make any
changes in taxes unpredictable.
The government budget deficit can be written as
deft , bt+1 − bt
=
(
R˜− 1
)
bt +
1
1 + n
gt − 1
1 + n
τt
= −
∞∑
j=1
R˜−jEt [∆gt+j ] , (15)
which means the government sets the budget deficit to be equal to expected changes in government
spending. Using (11), we obtain deft =
1
1+n
1−ρg
R˜−ρg (gt − g), that is, the government deficit is
positively correlated with government spending. We now consider two special cases: (i) when
the government spending shock is permanent, i.e., ρg = 1 (e.g., expenditures on education and
health care), and (ii) when the shock is purely transitory, i.e., ρg = 0 (e.g., expenditures on
unemployment benefit and natural disaster). From (14) and (15), it is clear that for the first case,
it is optimal to absorb a permanent expenditure shock entirely by taxes because
∆τt = t,
deft = 0.
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In contrast, for the second case,
∆τt =
R˜− 1
R˜
t
deft =
1
1 + n
1
R˜
t,
which means that for a positive government spending shock, τt must increase by
R˜−1
R˜
t and the
debt must be raised by 11+n
1
R˜
t to guarantee that the GBC is satisfied. In other words, a proportion
of the positive shock, R˜−1
R˜
, is absorbed by taxation and the rest 1
R˜
is absorbed by debt. Since R˜
is close to 1, most of the shock is absorbed by debt.
2.2 Model’s Predictions
Using (14), it is straightforward to compute the relative volatility of the change in tax rates to
government spending, which we denote by µ:
µ , sd (∆τt)
sd (∆gt)
=
R˜− 1
R˜− ρg
√
1 + ρg
2
, (16)
where sd denotes standard deviation and we use the fact that ∆gt =
(ρg−1)t−1
1−ρgL + t, where L is
the lag operator. Using the estimated ρg reported in Table 1 (linear filter) and assuming that
R˜ = 1.01, the RE model predicts that µ = 0.056. However, in the data as reported in Table 1,
µ = 1.18, so the model is not even in the ballpark.17 Given the estimated processes of government
spending, the model predicts that changes in tax rates (relative to changes in spending) should
be much smaller than they are in the data.
Using (15), the model predicts that the contemporaneous correlation between government debt
and government spending, corr (def t, gt), is 1. This model prediction contradicts the empirical
evidence: in the data the empirical correlation between them is well below 1. As reported in
Table 1, corr (def t, gt) = 0.73 (for linear filter) and 0.56 (for HP filter).
In the literature, there are two other common tests on the time series properties of average tax
rates and deficits. The first is to test whether tax rates follow a random walk. For example, Barro
(1981) found that the average tax rate in the U.S. between 1884 and 1979 follows a random walk.18
However, as is well known, this test is not conclusive for the tax-smoothing hypothesis (TSH)
because tax rates could also follow a random walk if the rates are determined by a random political
process. The second is to test whether the budget balance is informative about future changes in
government spending using the VAR techniques. For example, Huang and Lin (1993) and Ghosh
17Given the estimated ρg using HP filter reported in Table 1, the RE model predicts that µ = 0.018, which is
even smaller relative to the data.
18Other studies include Trechan and Walsh (1988) for the U.S., Ghosh (1995) for the U.S. and Canada, and
Strazicich (1997) for the sub-national governments of Canada and the U.S..
8
(1995) applied Campbell’s (1987) VAR approach and found that increases in the budget surplus
signal future increases in government expenditure, which supports the tax-smoothing hypothesis.19
This VAR approach is to formulate the TSH as an expression for budget surplus (or deficits)
because it takes into account the entire structure of the TSH model and then use a bivariate
VAR for government spending and the budget surplus to evaluate the restrictions imposed by
the TSH model. The basic idea of this approach is that using the bivariate VAR, it is possible
to compute the predicted time path of the budget deficits that is optimal for the government
under the TSH and then compare this optimal path to the actual time path of the budget deficits.
Specifically, we compare the optimal path of deficits, deft = −
∑∞
j=1 R˜
−jEt [∆gt+j ], to the actual
one, deft = (R− 1) bt + gt − τt, using the following bivariate VAR:20[
∆gt+1
deft+1
]
=
[
a11 a12
a21 a22
][
∆gt
deft
]
+
[
e1,t+1
e2,t+1
]
, (17)
or zt+1 = Azt+et+1, where e1,t+1 and e2,t+1 are the VAR innovations. Denote et+1 =
[
e1,t+1 e2,t+1
]
and assume that Σe = E
[
et+1e
′
t+1
]
is the 2 × 2 variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form
VAR innovations. The k-step ahead forecast from the VAR is
Et [zt+k] = A
kzt
and (15), deft = −
∑∞
j=1 R˜
−jEt [∆gt+j ], can be rewritten as
[
0 1
]
zt =
∞∑
j=1
R˜−jAj
[
1 0
]
zt.
Given that both ∆gt and deft are stationary, the infinite sum in the above equation converges to
def∗t = −
[
1 0
]
AR˜−1
(
I −AR˜−1
)−1
zt ≡ Λzt = λ1∆gt + λ2deft. (18)
Therefore, if the null hypothesis that the government smooths taxes over time is correct, the
recovered coefficients from the estimated VAR, λ1 and λ2, should be 0 and 1, respectively. We
will use this test in Section 4; to satisfy the reader’s curiosity for the moment, we note here that
a joint test of these restrictions under rational expectations has a Wald statistic of 24.9 on data
from 1960− 2007, which is about as strong a rejection as one is likely to see (see Table 6).
19Adler (2006) tested the TSH using Swedish data from the period 1952−1999, and found that the tax smoothing
behavior of the government can explain a significant fraction of the variability in the Swedish government budget
deficits.
20As argued in Campbell (1987), Huang and Lin (1993), Ghosh (1995), and others, although the information set
of an econometrician is only a subset of the government’s information set, the econometrician can still compute the
predicted path of the budget deficit because the deficit itself contains all of the information about future changes
in government spending. That is, the budget deficit should Granger-cause changes in government spending.
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3 Incorporating Robustness
3.1 The RB Version of the Tax Smoothing Hypothesis Model
Robust control emerged in the engineering literature in the 1970s and was introduced into eco-
nomics and further developed by Hansen, Sargent, and others. A simple version of robust optimal
control considers the question of how to make decisions when the agent does not know the prob-
ability model that generates the data. Specifically, an agent with a preference for robustness
considers a range of models surrounding the given approximating model, (8):
ht+1 = R˜ht − 1
1 + n
τt + ζ˜t+1 + ωζ˜νt, (19)
where ζ˜t+1 =
1
1+nζt+1 and ωζ˜ =
1
1+nωζ , and makes decisions that maximize lifetime expected
utility given this worst possible model (i.e., the distorted model). To make that model (8) is a
good approximation when (19) generates the data, we constrain the approximation errors by an
upper bound η0:
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt+1ν2t
]
≤ η0, (20)
where E0 [·] denotes conditional expectations evaluated with the model, and the left side of this
inequality is a statistical measure of the discrepancy between the distorted and approximating
models. Note that the standard full-information RE case corresponds to η0 = 0. In the general
case in which η0 > 0, the evil agent is given an intertemporal entropy budget η0 > 0 which defines
the set of models that the agent is considering. Following Hansen and Sargent (2007), we compute
robust decision rules by solving the following two-player zero-sum game: a minimizing decision
maker chooses optimal taxation {τt} and a maximizing evil agent chooses model distortions {νt}.
Specifically, the robustness version of the Barro model proposed in Section 2 can be written as
v (ht) = max
τt
min
νt
{
−1
2
(τt + ϕ)
2 + β
[
ϑν2t + Et [v (ht+1)]
]}
(21)
subject to the distorted transition equation (i.e., the worst-case model), (19), where νt distorts
the mean of the innovation, and ϑ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint specified in
(20) and controls how bad the error can be.21
When the ratio of government spending to real GDP follows the AR(1) process, (11), solving
this robust control problem yields the following proposition:
21Formally, this setup is a game between the decision-maker and a malevolent nature that chooses the distortion
process νt. ϑ ≥ 0 is a penalty parameter that restricts attention to a limited class of distortion processes; it can be
mapped into an entropy condition that implies agents choose rules that are robust against processes which are close
to the trusted one. In a later section we will apply an error detection approach to calibrate ϑ in the U.S. economy.
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Proposition 1 Under RB, the optimal tax function is
τt =
(1 + n)
(
R˜− 1
)
1− Σ ht +
Σϕ
1− Σ , (22)
the mean of the worst-case shock is
νtωζ˜ =
(
R˜− 1
)
Σ
1− Σ ht +
1
1 + n
Σ
1− Σϕ, (23)
the government deficit can be written as
deft = bt+1 − bt = 1
1 + n
1− ρg
R˜− ρg
(gt − g)− (1− ρh)ht − 1
1 + n
Σϕ
1− Σ , (24)
and ht
(
= bt +
1
(1+n)(R˜−ρg)gt +
(1−ρg)g
(1+n)(R˜−ρg)(R˜−1)
)
is governed by
ht+1 = ρhht − 1
1 + n
Σϕ
1− Σ + ζ˜t+1, (25)
where ζt+1 =
1
R˜−ρg t+1, ζ˜t+1 =
1
1+nζt+1,
Σ = (1 + n)2 R˜ω2
ζ˜
/ (2ϑ) = R˜ω2ζ/ (2ϑ) > 0 (26)
measures the degree of the preference of robustness, and ρh =
1−R˜Σ
1−Σ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. See Online Appendix 6.2.
The univariate RB model with unique state variable h leads to the same taxation function
as the corresponding multivariate RB model in which the state variables are bt and gt. The key
difference between these two models is that in the univariate RB model the evil agent distorts the
transition equation of permanent spending ht, whereas in the multivariate RB model the evil agent
distorts the spending-output ratio process gt. Theoretically, introducing RB into the multivariate
model affects both the coefficients attached to bt and gt in the taxation function. That is, in
the multivariate model RB may affect the relative importance of the two state variables in the
taxation function, whereas in the univariate model the relative importance of the two effects are
fixed by reducing the (b, g) state space to the univariate state h. However, after solving the two-
state model numerically using the standard procedure proposed in Hansen and Sargent (2007),
we can see that the two models lead to the same decision rule (see Online Appendix 6.3); the
intuition is that the debt evolves deterministically from t to t + 1, so that the evil agent cannot
influence it. The main reason that we adopt the univariate RB model here is to obtain the explicit
expressions for optimal taxation and government debts which can be easily used to compute the
model’s stochastic properties (e.g., the relative volatility of taxation and debts to government
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spending and the correlation between government debts and spending) and form the VAR test
conducted in section 4.4.
The effect of the preference for robustness, Σ, is jointly determined by the RB parameter, ϑ,
and the volatility of the permanent spending shock, ω
ζ˜
. This interaction provides a novel channel
through which the government spending shock affects optimal taxation and debts. Specifically,
optimal taxation under RB, (22), shows that the preference for robustness, ϑ, affects the optimal
response of optimal taxation to the change in permanent government expenditures, (1 + n) R˜−11−Σ .
The smaller the value of ϑ the larger the response of optimal taxation; that is, under RB optimal
taxation is more sensitive to unanticipated government spending shocks. This response is referred
to as “making hay while the sun shines” in van der Ploeg (1993) to explain the overreaction
of consumption to unanticipated income shocks, and reflects the precautionary aspect of these
preferences.
It is also worth noting that although assuming that the government has a CARA loss/utility
function proposed by Caballero (1990) (i.e., a positive third derivative of c (τt)) also leads to the
precautionary behavior via reducing the intercept term in the taxation function, RB and CARA
preferences have distinct implications for the marginal propensity to tax (MPT). Specifically,
CARA has no impact on the MPT, whereas RB increases the MPT. Since MPT governs the
model’s dynamic behavior and stochastic properties, incorporating the CARA preference does
not change the model’s predictions either unconditionally or conditionally. Intuitively, under RB,
in response to a negative government spending shock, the government would choose to reduce
taxes more than that predicted in the standard quadratic or CARA-TSH model. We think that
this feature could have the potential to distinguish CARA and RB preferences.
Proposition 2 Σ < 1.
Proof. The second-order condition for a minimization by nature is
A =
1
2
(1 + n)2 R˜
(
R˜− 1
)
1− (1 + n)2 R˜ω2
ζ˜
/ (2ϑ)
> 0,
which can be rearranged into
ϑ > (1 + n)2 R˜ω2
ζ˜
. (27)
Using the definition of Σ we obtain
1 > Σ.
It is straightforward to show that the robust policy rule, (22), can also be obtained by solving
the following risk-sensitive TSH model:
v (ht) = max
τt
{
−1
2
(τt + ϕ)
2 + βRt [v (ht+1)]
}
(28)
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subject to (8), and the distorted expectation operator Rt is defined by
Rt [v (ht+1)] = − 1
α
logEt [exp (−αv (ht+1))] , (29)
where α > 0 measures higher risk aversion of the government vis a vis the von Neumann-
Morgenstern specification.22 Risk-sensitivity (RS) was first introduced into the LQG framework
by Jacobson (1973) and extended by Whittle (1981). van der Ploeg (1993) applied this preference
to examine its implication for precautionary savings; Hansen and Sargent (1995) introduced dis-
counting into the RS specification and showed that the resulting decision rules are time-invariant;
Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) also explored its implications for precautionary savings
and asset prices; and Luo and Young (2010) examined its implications for consumption and pre-
cautionary savings when consumers are inattentive. In the risk-sensitive TSH specified in (28),
the government is prudent in the sense that they minimize the expected value of an exponential
transformation of a quadratic welfare loss function and adjust optimal taxation policy more ag-
gressively to changes in government expenditures. Note that as examined in Hansen and Sargent
(2007), we can obtain the same Bellman equation as (28) if using the multiplier preference to
model RB:
v (ht) = max
τt
{
−1
2
(τt + ϕ)
2 + β min
mt+1
{Et [mt+1v (ht+1)] + ϑEt [mt+1 lnmt+1]}
}
, (30)
where Et [mt+1 lnmt+1] is the relative entropy of the distribution of the distorted model with
respect to that of the approximating model, and ϑ > 0 is the shadow price of capacity that can
reduce the distance between the two distributions, i.e., the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint:
Et [mt+1 lnmt+1] ≤ η. Minimizing with respect to mt+1 yields mt+1 = exp(−
1
ϑ
v(ht+1))
Et[exp(− 1ϑv(ht+1))]
, and it
is straightforward to show that substituting mt+1 into (30) yields (28).
3.2 Implications of RB for Tax Smoothing and Government Debt
Given the expression for optimal taxation (22), the dynamics of tax can be written as
τt+1 = ρhτt +
(1 + n)
(
R˜− 1
)
1− Σ ζ˜t+1−
(
R˜− 1
) Σϕ
1− Σ , or τt+1 = ρhτt +
R˜− 1
1− Σ ζt+1−
(
R˜− 1
) Σϕ
1− Σ
(31)
and the government deficit can be rewritten as the following AR(1) process:
deft+1 = ρhdeft +
1
1 + n
(1− ρg) (ρg − ρh)
R˜− ρg
(gt − g) + (ρh − ρg) ζ˜t+1 (32)
22The detailed proof is available from the authors by request. The observational equivalence between the risk-
sensitive and robust LQG models has been well established in the literature. See Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarni
(1999), Backus, Routledge, and Zin (2004), and Luo and Young (2010).
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It is interesting to point out that even if the government’s subjective discount factor is assumed
to equal the inverse of the effective interest rate, i.e., βR˜ = 1, the tax-tilting aspect of government
budget deficits still exists under RB. The intuition is very simple: The effect of RB on optimal
taxation and deficits are the same as that of the discount factor within the LQ setting.23 We also
note that the tax rate is a stationary process even if g is a random walk, in contrast to the RE
model.
3.2.1 The Relative Volatility of Taxes and Government Debts to Government Spend-
ing
The relative volatility of the change in tax rates to government spending, µ, can be written as
µ , sd (∆τt)
sd (∆gt)
=
R˜− 1
(1− Σ)
(
R˜− ρg
)√1 + ρg
1 + ρh
, (33)
where we use the fact that ∆gt =
(ρg−1)t−1
1−ρgL + t.
24 (See Online Appendix 6.3.) It is clear from
(33) that RB increases the relative volatility via two channels: first, it increases the marginal
propensity to tax based on permanent government spending
(
R˜−1
1−Σ
)
; and second, it increases the
volatility of the change in the tax rate by reducing the persistence of the tax dynamics. The latter
is because the persistence of tax dynamics is the same as the persistence of permanent government
spending measured by ρh and it is easy to show
∂ρh
∂Σ < 0. Figure ?? provides a graphic view how
this relative volatility decreases with the degree of model uncertainty, Σ.
3.2.2 The Correlation between the Government Debt and Government Spending
A description of the comovement of the government debt and government spending is the con-
temporaneous correlation between them, corr (def t, gt). Under RB, the correlation can be written
as:
corr (deft, gt) =
(
1
1 + ρg
− 1− ρh
1− ρgρh
)
/
[√
1
1− ρ2g
√
1− ρg
1 + ρg
+
1− ρh
1 + ρh
− 2(1− ρh) (1− ρg)
1− ρgρh
]
,
(34)
which converges to 1 as Σ converges to 0. Figure 3 illustrates how RB affects the correlation
between the government debt and government spending for different values of ρg. It is clear that
corr (deft, gt) is decreasing with Σ. If we decompose this correlation into two terms,the covariance
between deficit and spending (the nominator) and the variances (the denominator), we find that
23See Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) and Luo and Young (2010) for discussions on the observational
equivalence between RB and the discount factor in the LQ permanent income models.
24We use the relative volatility of the change in the tax rate to the change in government spending instead of
that of the tax rate to government spending to compare the implications of RE and RB models, as the tax rate
follows a random walk under RE and the volatility of the tax rate is not well defined in this model.
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the decrease of the correlation between deficit and spending is mainly driven by the decrease
in the covariance term as the degree of model uncertainty (Σ) increases. Using the explicitly
derived expression for this covariance term, cov (deft, gt) (see Online Appendix 6.3), it can be
shown that cov (deft, gt) is a monotonically increasing function of the persistence of the deficit
function, measured by ρh. Thus, as an increase in the degree of model uncertainty (Σ) reduces
ρh, cov (deft, gt) falls. Therefore, as RE over-predicts the correlation between debt and spending,
RB aligns the model and the data more closely along this dimension.
3.3 Two Special Cases
3.3.1 A Permanent Increase in Government Spending
Under RB, when ρg = 1, we have
∆τt =
ρh − 1
1− Σ
1
1− ρhLt−1 +
1
1− Σt, (35)
deft = − 1
1 + n
Σ
1− Σ
1
1− ρhLt = −
1
1 + n
Σ
1− Σ
1
1− ρhLt−1 −
1
1 + n
Σ
1− Σt. (36)
It is clear that in this permanent income case, a proportion 11−Σ of a newly-arrived shock (t) is
absorbed by τt and − 11+n Σ1−Σ of the shock is absorbed by debt. In other words, taxation is more
sensitive to the permanent shock under RB and thus the government debt can be reduced even if
the spending shock is positive. In addition, both taxes and debts react to the lagged innovations
to government spending. This prediction is clearly different from what we obtained in the RE
model: the permanent expenditure shock is absorbed entirely by taxes.
3.3.2 A Temporary Increase in Government Spending
Under RB, when ρg = 0, we have
∆τt =
(ρh − 1)
(
R˜− 1
)
(1− Σ) R˜
t−1
1− ρhL +
R˜− 1
(1− Σ) R˜t, (37)
deft =
1
1 + n
 1
R˜
t −
Σ
(
R˜− 1
)
(1− Σ) R˜
t
1− ρhL
 = 1
1 + n
−Σ
(
R˜− 1
)
(1− Σ) R˜
ρh
1− ρhLt−1 +
1− ΣR˜
(1− Σ) R˜t
 ,
(38)
which means that for a positive government spending shock (t), τt must increase by
R˜−1
(1−Σ)R˜t
and the debt must be reduced by 1−ΣR˜
(1−Σ)R˜t.
25 In other words, a proportion of the positive shock,
R˜−1
(1−Σ)R˜ , is absorbed by taxation and the rest,
1−ΣR˜
(1−Σ)R˜ , is absorbed by debt. Note that in the
25Note that here we need to impose the restriction that Σ < 1/R˜.
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RE model a proportion of the shock, R˜−1
R˜
, is absorbed by taxation and the rest, 1
R˜
, is absorbed
by debt. Since Σ > 0, it is clear that RB strengthens the relative importance of taxation to
government debts in absorbing the government spending shock.
3.4 Extensions: Multiple Shocks
3.4.1 Extension 1: Multiple Government Spending Shocks
In the benchmark model presented above, we assume that there is only a single shock to govern-
ment spending. Since government spending in the model, g, is a ratio of the amount of government
expenditures to real GDP, G/Y , there might exist multiple shocks to g as real GDP can also be
modelled with multiple shocks. In this section, we consider both permanent and transitory shocks
to government spending simultaneously and show that incorporating multiple shocks does not af-
fect our results on how RB affects the two key unconditional moments we discussed in the previous
subsection.
Specifically, we now assume that the government spending-real GDP ratio gt can be expressed
as the sum of permanent and transitory components:
gt+1 = g
p
t+1 + g
t
t+1, (39)
where the superscripts p and t denote permanent and transitory, respectively. Each of these
components follows its own stochastic process; gpt follows a random walk:
gpt+1 = g
p
t + εt+1, (40)
and the transitory component follows a stationary AR process:
gtt+1 = g + ρg
(
gtt − g
)
+ t+1, (41)
where ρg ∈ [0, 1), and all innovations are assumed to have zero mean, be uncorrelated over time
and with each other, and the variance of εt and t are ω
2
ε and ω
2
 , respectively. We assume
that the decomposition of net income, (ω2ε , ω
2
 , ρg), does not affect the volatility of the change
in observed g (sd (∆gt)). For simplicity, we consider the case in which ρg = 0 and ω
2
ε = mω
2

(m > 0). (Allowing ρg > 0 does not affect our conclusions that RB has similar impacts on the
joint dynamics of government taxes, deficits, and spending.)
Given the specifications, it is straightforward to show that the relative volatility of the change
in tax rates to government spending, µ, can be written as
µ , sd (∆τt)
sd (∆gt)
=
√√√√√√ 2
(
R˜− 1
)2
(1− Σ)
[
2− Σ
(
1 + R˜
)]/
 2 +m
m/
(
R˜− 1
)2
+ 1/R˜2
, (42)
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where we use the facts that ∆gt+1 = εt+1 +t+1−t, ∆τt+1 = (ρh − 1) τt+ R˜−11−Σζt+1−
(
R˜− 1
)
Σϕ
1−Σ ,
and ζt+1 =
εt+1
R−1 +
t+1
R . Given that R˜ = 1.01, the full-information RE model predicts that
µ = 0.056, which contradicts the empirical counterpart reported in Table 1, µ = 1.18. Figure 4
illustrates how this relative volatility varies with the degree of model uncertainty, Σ, for different
values of m that measure the relative importance of the permanent shock (ε) to the transitory
shock (). It clearly shows that this ratio is consistently increasing with Σ, which means that
incorporating RB into the multiple-shock case has the potential to help improve the model’s
predictions. For example, when m = 1 and Σ = 0.52, µ = 1.21, which is very close to its empirical
counterpart.
The correlation between the deficits and the change in government spending can be written
as:26
corr (deft,∆gt) =
−m (1− ρh) /
[
(1 + n)
(
R˜− 1
)]
+ ρh (2− ρh) /R
√
2 +m
√(
1
R
)2
+
[
2
(R˜−1)2
+ 1
R˜2
](
1−ρh
1+ρh
)
/ (1 + n)2 − 2(1−ρh)
R2
, (43)
which converges to 1 as Σ converges to 0. Figure 5 illustrates how RB affects the correlation
between the government debt and government spending for different values of m. It is clear that
corr (deft,∆gt) is consistently decreasing with Σ in the multiple-shock case, which means that
RB can also have the potential to help explain this dimension. For example, when m = 1 and
Σ = 0.1, corr (deft,∆gt) = 0.2, which is much closer to its empirical counterpart, 0.05. (Note
that in the full-information RE case corr (deft,∆gt) = 0.6.)
3.4.2 Extension 2: Shock to Output Growth
In the benchmark model, we assume that output growth is constant. In this section, we consider
an extension in which the growth rate of real GDP follows a stochastic process. In this extension,
the GBC becomes
(1 + nt+1) bt+1 = Rbt + gt − τt, (44)
where nt+1 follows an AR(1) process
nt+1 − n = ρn (nt − n) + ηt+1, (45)
where ηt+1 is an iid shock with mean zero and variance ω
2
η, and n is the steady state growth rate
of real GDP. To maintain the model within the LQG setting, we approximate the GBC around
the steady state as follows:
(1 + n) bt+1 + bnt+1 = Rbt + gt − τt, (46)
26Note that here we use corr (deft,∆gt) instead of corr (deft, gt) because in this case the government spending
process is non-stationary and thus corr (deft, gt) is not well-defined.
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where b is the steady state debt-to-output ratio.
With these specifications, it is straightforward to show that the relative volatility of the change
in tax rates to government spending, µ, can be written as
µ , sd (∆τt)
sd (∆gt)
=
R˜− 1
R˜− ρg
√√√√√1 + ρg
2
1 + (bR˜)2( R˜− ρg
R˜− ρn
)2
ω2η
ω2
. (47)
Using the U.S. data from 1960 − 2007, we estimate that ρn = 0.607, ρg = 0.844, ωη = 0.017,
ω = 0.006, and b = 0.363. Given that R˜ = 1.01, the full-information RE model predicts that
µ = 0.06, which means that the model with a shock to output growth still contradicts the empirical
counterpart reported in Table 1, µ = 1.18. Furthermore, the contemporaneous correlation between
the government debt and government spending is
corr (deft, gt) =
1√
1 +
(
bρn
(1−ρn)(R˜−ρg)
(1−ρg)(R˜−ρn)
)2
ω2η(1−ρ2g)
ω2 (1−ρ2n)
. (48)
Given these values, we compute that corr (deft, gt) = 0.93, which again contradicts the empirical
counterpart, 0.73 (for linear filter).
Under RB, following the same procedure adopted in the benchmark model, the relative volatil-
ity of the change in tax rates to government spending is obtained as follows:
µ =
(
R˜− 1
1− Σ
)(
1
R˜− ρg
)√√√√√1 + ρg
1 + ρh
1 + (bR˜)2( R˜− ρg
R˜− ρn
)2
ω2η
ω2
, (49)
which clearly shows that µ is consistently increasing with Σ, which means that incorporating RB
into this multiple-shock case has similar impact on the relative volatility as in the benchmark case
and thus has the potential to generate more realistic relative volatility. The correlation between
the deficits and the change in government spending can be written as:
corr (deft, gt) =
(
1
1+ρg
− 1−ρh1−ρgρh
)
√
1
1−ρ2g
√
Ωg + Ωn
, (50)
where Ωg =
1−ρg
1+ρg
+ 1−ρh1+ρh − 2
(1−ρg)(1−ρh)
1−ρgρh and Ωn = b
2
 ρ2n(1−ρn)1+ρn + (R˜− ρn)2
+1−ρh1+ρh R˜
2 − 2ρnR˜(1−ρn)(1−ρh)1−ρnρh
 ω2η
ω2
. Com-
paring it with (34), it is clear that the only difference between them is the additional term, Ωn,
in (50), and RB has the same impact on Ωn as on Ωg. Therefore, incorporating RB into this
multiple-shock case can also have the potential to help explain this dimension.
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4 Calibration and Main Findings
In the previous section we have seen that the model uncertainty due to the preference for robust-
ness can help better explain the observed relative volatility of the tax rate and the correlation
between government budget deficit and government spending. Specifically, we have shown that
an increase of Σ (which measures the RB effect) increases the relative volatility of the tax rate
and reduces the correlation between government budget deficit and government spending. But
careful readers may still have questions on how to further interpret this parameter. For example,
two very reasonable questions are: What does Σ really measure? How should we link the value
of Σ to the degree of model uncertainty? Thus, in this section, we will provide one useful method
to quantify the RB effect, Σ, which intuitively links it to the degree of model uncertainty.
4.1 Calibrating the RB Parameter
We follow Hansen, Sargent, and Wang (2002) and Hansen and Sargent (2007) to calibrate the
RB parameter (ϑ and Σ). Specifically, we calibrate the model by using the model detection error
probability that is based on a statistical theory of model selection (the approach will be precisely
defined below). We can then infer what values of the RB parameter ϑ imply reasonable fears
of model misspecification for empirically-plausible approximating models. In other words, the
model detection error probability is a measure of how far the distorted model can deviate from
the approximating model without being discarded; standard significance levels for testing are then
used to determine what reasonable fears entail.
4.1.1 The Definition of the Model Detection Error Probability
Let’s use model A to denote the approximating model and model B to denote the distorted model.
Define pA as
pA = Prob
(
log
(
LA
LB
)
< 0
∣∣∣∣A) , (51)
where log
(
LA
LB
)
is the log-likelihood ratio. When model A generates the data, pA measures the
probability that a likelihood ratio test selects model B. In this case, we call pA the probability of
the model detection error. Similarly, when model B generates the data, we can define pB as
pB = Prob
(
log
(
LA
LB
)
> 0
∣∣∣∣B) . (52)
Following Hansen, Sargent, and Wang (2002) and Hansen and Sargent (2007), we can define
the detection error probability, p, as the average of pA and pB:
p (ϑ) =
1
2
(pA + pB) , (53)
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where ϑ is the robustness parameter used to generate model B. By this definition, 1−p measures
the probability that econometricians can distinguish the approximating model from the distorted
model. The next subsection shows how to compute the model detection error probability in the
RB model.
4.1.2 Calibrating the RB Parameter in the Tax-smoothing Model
Let’s first consider the RB model. Under RB, assuming that the approximating model generates
the data, the state, ht, evolves according to the transition law
ht+1 = R˜ht − 1
1 + n
τt + ζ˜t+1,
=
1− R˜Σ
1− Σ ht −
1
1 + n
Σϕ
1− Σ + ζ˜t+1. (54)
In contrast, assuming that the distorted model generates the data, ht evolves according to
ht+1 = R˜ht − 1
1 + n
τt + ζ˜t+1 + ωζ˜νt,
= ht + ζ˜t+1. (55)
To compute pA and pB, we use the following procedure:
1. Simulate {ht}Tt=0 using (54) and (55) a large number of times. The number of periods used
in the simulation, T , is set to be the actual length of the U.S. data.
2. Count the number of times that log
(
LA
LB
)
< 0
∣∣∣A and log (LALB ) > 0∣∣∣B are each satisfied.
3. Determine pA and pB as the fractions of realizations for which log
(
LA
LB
)
< 0
∣∣∣A and log (LALB ) > 0∣∣∣B,
respectively.
In the above simulation, the volatility of ζt is computed using sd (ζ) =
√
1−ρ2g
R−ρg sd (g), where sd (g)
is the standard deviation of government spending. ϕ is set to be −τ¯ where τ¯ is the average tax
rate in the data.27
4.2 Data
To implement the calibration described in the previous section, we need to have the measure of
GDP, government spending (Gt), government debt (Bt), government budget deficit (deft), tax rate
(τt), and risk-free interest rate. We follow Huang and Lin (1993) and Lloyd-Ellis et al. (2005) to
construct these variables and use the same data sources as described in their papers. Specifically,
27We follow Luo et al.(2012) to use the local coefficient for relative risk aversion of the loss function to recover
the parameter.
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government expenditures are constructed by using federal expenditures minus net federal interest
payments. The data on both variables are taken from National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA). Government budget deficit is defined as total outlays minus total receipts.28 Government
debt is defined as the federal debt (end of period) held by the public. Tax rate is defined as tax
revenues divided by GDP. The data on these variables are taken from The Economic Report of
President, 2011. The data covers the period 1960− 2007.29 Finally, we need to know the annual
growth rate of real GDP, n, and the risk-free interest rate, R. Using the real GDP data from
NIPA, the former is calculated as the average annual growth rate of real GDP in the period of
1960− 2007, which is 3%. We set the risk-free rate to be 1.04 such that the effective interest rate
R˜ = 1.01.
For variables as a ratio of GDP, we use either a linear filter or the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter
(with a smoothing parameter of 100) to detrend the data.30 For variables expressed in the form
of differences (with a symbol ∆) the unfiltered series are used.
4.3 Main Results
The calibration results are reported in Table 2. We set p = 0.1 which means that there exists
a 10-percent chance a likelihood ratio test fails to separate the approximating model and the
distorted model. The resulted value of the RB parameter Σ (which measures the effect of RB) is
0.96. In the same table, we also report the persistence of the government spending (as a ratio of
GDP), g, and the measured coefficient of variation for the processes of g and ζ (the innovation to
the ht process defined in budget constraint equation (8)).
As shown in the previous section, introducing model uncertainty (concern for robustness)
qualitatively improves the model performance in explaining the two unconditional moments: (1)
the relative standard deviation of the tax rate, sd(∆τ)sd(∆g) ; and (2) the correlation between government
budget deficit and government spending, corr(def, g). Specifically, we have shown that an increase
of Σ can increase the relative standard deviation of the tax rate while reducing the correlation of
the government budget deficit and government spending. Since we now have a calibrated value
of Σ, we can quantitatively show these improvements more clearly by comparing the predicted
values from the RE and the RB models. The results are reported in Table 3.
The first column of Table 3 lists the values of the two moments in the data. The second
column reports predictions of the RE model with no model uncertainty. As it shows, the relative
volatility of the tax rate predicted by the RE model is only 0.04 while it is 1.18 in the data. On
the other hand, the RE model overpredicts the correlation between government budget deficit and
28In Lloyd-Ellis, Zhan, and Zhu (2005), the authors use the government budget surplus, which is defined as total
receipts minus total outlays.
29As US government debt remained at very high levels during and after the Korean War period, here we excludes
the high debt years surrounding the Korean War. In addition, we also exclude the 2008-2010 financial crisis period.
30We report the values of the key moments using both filters in Table 1.
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government spending. As a comparison, the RB (at p = 0.1) can predict values that are much
closer to the data, as shown in the third column. These results confirm our theoretic findings in
Section 3. In that section, we have shown that as the RB effect (measured by Σ) increases, the
model can predict more reasonable relative volatility of the tax rate and the correlation between
deficit and spending. The results in Table 3 present one numerical example of the magnitude of
the improvements. Of course, the improvements depend on the detection error probability that
is used.
As we have explained before, using the model detection error probability (p) is one intuitive
way to measure the model uncertainty. In this example, we set p = 0.1 so that agents are
considering a range of models which cannot be distinguished by a likelihood ratio test up to
a probability of 0.1.31 Alternatively speaking, this means that agents suspect that the model
is misspecified to a certain degree that a likelihood ratio test cannot separate the (unknown)
true model with other similar models by a 10-percent chance. To see how the degree of model
uncertainty affects the model prediction and provide more robust check, we vary the detection
error probability p (or the degree of model uncertainty) and report the corresponding results in
Table 5. The corresponding calibrated values of Σ are reported in Table 4. Remember that as
the detection error probability (p) increases, it becomes more difficult (using a likelihood-ratio
test) to distinguish the set of considered models. Thus the range of models considered have to
be smaller. In other words, there is less model uncertainty or agents have less concern about
the model misspecifcations. As Table 5 shows, as the degree of the model uncertainty decreases,
the relative volatility of the tax rate declines and the correlation between deficit and government
spending increases. These findings again confirm the theoretic results in the previous sections.
4.4 Implications of RB for the Bivariate VAR Test on the TSH
In this subsection, we examine the implications of RB for the bivariate VAR test on the TSH
mentioned in section 2.2. Using the optimal taxation function under RB, τt =
(1+n)(R˜−1)
1−Σ ht+
Σϕ
1−Σ ,
obtained in Section 3.1., the resulting deficit equation can be written as
deft = −
∞∑
j=0
R˜−jEt [∆gt+j ]− Στt or d˜ef t = −
∞∑
j=0
R˜−jEt [∆gt+j ]
where d˜ef t = deft + Στt. Following the same procedure as discussed in Section 2.2, the VAR can
be formulated as [
∆gt+1
d˜ef t+1
]
=
[
a11 a12
a21 a22
][
∆gt
d˜ef t
]
+
[
e1,t+1
e2,t+1
]
. (56)
Table 6 reports the recovered λ1 and λ2 from the full-information RE and RB models using data
for the period from 1960 − 2007. To investigate how model uncertainty affects test results, we
31A detection probability of 0.1 is what Hansen and Sargent (2007) proposes.
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report nine different RB models in which Σ varies from 0.1 to 0.9. Remember that a larger Σ
means more model uncertainty.32 The full-information RE model can be considered a model with
zero model uncertainty. Thus, in total, Table 6 reports the recovered values for λ1 and λ2 for
ten models differing only in the degree of model uncertainty, which increases from zero (the RE
model) to a significantly large degree (measured by Σ). The second and third columns show that
λ1 decreases with the degree of model uncertainty while λ2 increases with it. More importantly,
the increase of model uncertainty leads λ1 to decrease from a positive level to a level closer to 0
and λ2 to rise significantly toward 1. In other words, RB can help make the model better fit the
data because the recovered coefficients from the estimated VAR, λ1 and λ2, should be 0 and 1,
respectively, if the TSH holds.33 More formally, the last two columns report the Wald statistics
and the associated p-values for the joint hypothesis of λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 1. The Wald statistic
decreases and the associated p-value increases as the degree of model uncertainty increases. Of
particular interest is that the values of Σ consistent with reasonable detection error probabilities
– namely, those above 0.9 – are ones which potentially could pass the VAR tests.
5 Conclusions
This paper has reconsidered the tax-smoothing hypothesis model of Barro (1979) under the as-
sumption that the government faces model uncertainty regarding the stochastic process for re-
quired government spending. Our key finding is that many of the aspects of the tax-smoothing
model that are inconsistent with the data under rational expectations – that is, under the as-
sumption of no model uncertainty – are potentially consistent with the data when decisions by
the government are made with an eye on robustness. In particular, we can increase the volatility
of tax changes relative to changes in spending, decrease the correlation between spending and
deficits, and pass VAR tests regarding the joint dynamics of changes in spending and deficits.
6 Online Appendix (Not for Publication)
6.1 Solving the Full-information RE TSH Model
For the following optimization problem:
max
{τt,bt+1}
E0
[
−
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
1
2
(τt + ϕ)
2
)]
,
32As explained in the previous section, a larger Σ corresponds to a smaller the detection error probability which
means that the difference between the distorted model and the approximating model is larger. In other words, the
range of the models (around the approximating model) is larger, or, there is more model uncertainty faced by the
decision maker.
33An alternative interpretation is that incorporating certain degree of model uncertainty makes the TSH be less
likely to be rejected in the data.
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subject to (1 + n) bt+1 = Rbt + gt − τt, the Lagrangian function can be written as
L = E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
−1
2
(τt + ϕ)
2 − λt (Rbt + gt − τt − (1 + n) bt+1)
]}
The FOCs w.r.t. τt and bt+1 are:
− (τt + ϕ) + λt = 0
(1 + n)λt − βREt [λt+1] = 0
which means that
τt =
βR
1 + n
Et [τt+1] + ϕ
(
βR
1 + n
− 1
)
. (57)
When we impose the condition that βR1+n = 1, (57) leads to the well-known random walk result of
tax rates, τt = Et [τt+1].
The intertemporal budget constraint can be written as
∞∑
j=0
(
1 + n
R
)j
gt+j +Rbt =
∞∑
j=0
(
1 + n
R
)j
τt+j
Taking conditional expectations on both sides gives
Et
Rbt + ∞∑
j=0
(
1 + n
R
)j
gt+j
 = ∞∑
j=0
(
1 + n
R
)j
Et [τt+j ]
=
 ∞∑
j=0
(
1 + n
R
)j (1 + n
βR
)j τt
=
 ∞∑
j=0
(
(1 + n)2
βR2
)j τt
=
1
1− (1 + n)2 / (βR2)τt
and the optimal tax rate can be written as
τt =
(
1− (1 + n)
2
βR2
)
Et
Rbt + ∞∑
j=0
(
1 + n
R
)j
gt+j
 . (58)
In the case in which n = 0 and βR = 1,
τt = (R− 1)Et
bt + 1
R
∞∑
j=0
(
1
R
)j
gt+j

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After defining
ht = Et
bt + 1
R
∞∑
j=0
(
1 + n
R
)j
gt+j
 ,
and combining this expression with the original budget constraint, we obtain the following budget
constraint:
(1 + n)ht+1 = Rht − τt + ζt+1 or ht+1 = R
1 + n
ht − 1
1 + n
τt +
1
1 + n
ζt+1
where ζt+1 =
∑∞
j=0
(
1+n
R
)j+1
(Et+1 − Et) [gt+1+j ].
6.2 Solving the Robust TSH Model
To solve the Bellman equation (21), we conjecture that
v (ht) = −Ah2t −Bht − C,
where A, B, and C are undetermined coefficients. Substituting this guessed value function into
the Bellman equation gives
−Ah2t −Bht − C = maxτt minνt
{
−1
2
(τt + ϕ)
2 + βEt
[
ϑν2t −Ah2t+1 −Bht+1 − C
]}
, (59)
where ht+1 = R˜ht− 11+nτt + ζ˜t+1 +ωζ˜νt. We can do the min and max operations in any order, so
we choose to do the minimization first. The first-order condition for νt is
2ϑνt − 2AEt
(
R˜ht − 1
1 + n
τt + ωζ˜νt
)
ω
ζ˜
−Bω
ζ˜
= 0,
which means that
νt =
B + 2A
(
R˜ht − 11+nτt
)
2
(
ϑ−Aω2
ζ˜
) ω
ζ˜
. (60)
Substituting (60) back into (59) gives
−Ah2t−Bht−C = maxτt
−12 (τt + ϕ)2 + βEt
ϑ
B + 2A
(
R˜ht − 11+nτt
)
2
(
ϑ−Aω2
ζ˜
) ω
ζ˜
2 −Ah2t+1 −Bht+1 − C

 ,
The first-order condition for τt is
− (τt + ϕ)− 2βϑ 1
1 + n
Aω
ζ˜
ϑ−Aω2
ζ˜
νt + 2βA
1
1 + n
(
1 +
Aω2
ζ˜
ϑ−Aω2
ζ˜
)(
R˜ht − 1
1 + n
τt + ωζ˜νt
)
+βB
1
1 + n
(
1 +
Aω2
ζ˜
ϑ−Aω2
ζ˜
)
= 0.
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Using the solution for νt the solution for taxation is
τt =
2βR˜A
(1 + n)− (1 + n)Aω2
ζ˜
/ϑ+ 2βA/ (1 + n)
ht+
− (1 + n)
(
1−Aω2
ζ˜
/ϑ
)
ϕ+ βB
(1 + n)− (1 + n)Aω2
ζ˜
/ϑ+ 2βA/ (1 + n)
. (61)
Substituting the above expressions into the Bellman equation gives
−Ah2t −Bht − C
= −1
2
[
2βR˜A
(1 + n)− (1 + n)Aω2
ζ˜
/ϑ+ 2βA/ (1 + n)
ht +
βB + 2βϕA/ (1 + n)
(1 + n)− (1 + n)Aω2
ζ˜
/ϑ+ 2βA/ (1 + n)
]2
+
βϑω2
ζ˜[
2
(
ϑ−Aω2
ζ˜
)]2

2AR˜
[
(1+n)2−(1+n)2Aω2
ζ˜
/ϑ
(1+n)2−(1+n)2Aω2
ζ˜
/ϑ+2βA
]
ht
+
((1+n)2B+2A(1+n)ϕ)
(
1−Aω2
ζ˜
/ϑ
)
(1+n)2−(1+n)2Aω2
ζ˜
/ϑ+2βA

2
− βA

[
(1+n)2R˜
(1+n)2−(1+n)2Aω2
ζ˜
/ϑ+2βA
]2
h2t −
(1+n)2R˜
[
−2(1+n)ϕ+2βB−Bω2
ζ˜
/ϑ(1+n)2
]
[
(1+n)2−(1+n)2Aω2
ζ˜
/ϑ+2βA
]2 ht
+
−2(1+n)ϕ+2βB−Bω2
ζ˜
/ϑ(1+n)2
2
[
(1+n)2−(1+n)2Aω2
ζ˜
/ϑ+2βA
] + ω2
ζ˜

− βB
 (1 + n)2 R˜
(1 + n)2 − (1 + n)2Aω2
ζ˜
/ϑ+ 2βA
ht −
−2 (1 + n)ϕ+ 2βB −Bω2
ζ˜
/ϑ (1 + n)2
2
(
(1 + n)2 − (1 + n)2Aω2
ζ˜
/ϑ+ 2βA
)
− βC.
Given βR˜ = 1, collecting and matching terms, the constant coefficients turn out to be
A =
(1 + n)2 R˜
(
R˜− 1
)
2− (1 + n)2 R˜ω2
ζ˜
/ϑ
, (62)
B =
(1 + n)ϕR˜
1− (1 + n)2 R˜ω2
ζ˜
/ (2ϑ)
. (63)
Substituting (62) and (63) into (61) yields the taxation function (22) in the text.
We impose parameter restrictions so that A > 0, implying the value function is concave; these
restrictions amount to requiring that ϑ not be too small and are shown in the text to imply Σ < 1.
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6.3 Deriving the Stochastic Properties of Optimal Taxation and Government
Debts under RB
6.3.1 Deriving the Volatility of the Change in Taxes
Given (31), τt+1 = ρhτt +
R˜−1
1−Σζt+1 −
(
R˜− 1
)
Σϕ
1−Σ , the variance of ∆τt+1 can be written as:
var (∆τt+1) = var
(
(ρh − 1) τt + R˜− 1
1− Σ ζt+1
)
= (1− ρh)2
(
R˜− 1
1− Σ
)2
ω2ζ
1− ρ2h
+
(
R˜− 1
1− Σ
)2
ω2ζ
=
2
1 + ρh
(
R˜− 1
1− Σ
)2
ω2ζ .
Using the definition of the relative volatility of the change in taxes and government spending, we
can obtain (33) in the text.
6.3.2 Deriving the Correlation between Government Debts and Spending
Given (24), deft =
1−ρg
(1+n)(R˜−ρg) (gt − g)− (1− ρh)ht −
1
1+n
Σϕ
1−Σ ,
var (deft) = var
(
1
1 + n
1− ρg
R˜− ρg
gt − (1− ρh)ht
)
=
 1− ρg
(1 + n)
(
R˜− ρg
)
2 var (gt) + (1− ρh)2 var (ht)− 2 (1− ρg) (1− ρh)
(1 + n)
(
R˜− ρg
) cov (gt, ht)
=
(
1− ρg
R˜− ρg
)2 (R˜− ρg)2 ω2
ζ˜
1− ρ2g
+ (1− ρh)2
ω2
ζ˜
1− ρ2h
− 2(1− ρg) (1− ρh)
R˜− ρg
(
R˜− ρg
)
ω2
ζ˜
1− ρgρh
=
[
1− ρg
1 + ρg
+
1− ρh
1 + ρh
− 2(1− ρh) (1− ρg)
1− ρgρh
]
ω2
ζ˜
, (64)
where we use the facts that ρh = 1 − Σ(R˜−1)1−Σ , var (gt) = ω
2
1−ρ2g =
(R˜−ρg)2ω2ζ
1−ρ2g , var (ht) =
ω2
ζ˜
1−ρ2h
, and
cov (gt, ht) =
(1+n)(R˜−ρg)ω2
ζ˜
1−ρgρh . Using (24) and (11), the covariance between the government debt
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and spending is
cov (deft, gt) = cov
 1− ρg
(1 + n)
(
R˜− ρg
)gt − (1− ρh)ht, gt

=
1− ρg
(1 + n)
(
R˜− ρg
) var (gt)− (1− ρh) cov (ht, gt)
=
1− ρg
(1 + n)
(
R˜− ρg
)
(
R˜− ρg
)2
1− ρ2g
ω2ζ −
(1 + n)
(
R˜− ρg
)
(1− ρh)
1− ρgρh ω
2
ζ˜
= (1 + n)
(
R˜− ρg
)( 1
1 + ρg
− 1− ρh
1− ρgρh
)
ω2
ζ˜
. (65)
Using (64) and (65), the correlation between the current account and net income can be written
as (34) in the text.
6.4 The Equivalence between the Univariate and Multivariate RB Models
The solution methods used to solve the univariate model and the standard multivariate model are
different in the sense that the expectation operator applies to different objects. In the univariate
model, the evil agent distorts the transition equation of ht which by itself includes the expecta-
tion on future income, whereas in the multivariate model the evil agent distorts the government
spending process (gt). Note that in this case the evil agent does not distort the law of motion for
bt because it is a predetermined variable with no uncertainty given τt. Specifically, the following
compact matrix equation can be used to characterize the dynamics of (b, g):[
bt+1
gt+1
]
=
[
R˜ 11+n
0 ρg
][
bt
gt
]
−
[
1
1+n
0
]
τt +
[
0
1
]
t+1, (66)
where we ignore the constant term as it does not affect the stochastic properties of the model.
Assume that (66) is the approximation model. The corresponding distortion model is[
bt+1
gt+1
]
=
[
R˜ 11+n
0 ρg
][
bt
gt
]
−
[
1
1+n
0
]
τt +
[
0
1
]
(t+1 + ωνt) . (67)
The robust control problem can thus be written as follows:
v (bt, gt) = min
τt
max
νt
{
−1
2
τ2t + β
[
ϑν2t + Et [v (bt+1, gt+1)]
]}
, (68)
subject to (67). Since there is no closed-form solution for this problem, we solve this model
numerically. Following the standard procedure proposed in Hansen and Sargent (Chapters 2 and
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10, 2007), we can solve this robust linear-quadratic regulator numerically and obtain a linear
function of τt in terms of (bt, gt):
τt = MPT (bt + λgt) , (69)
where MPT is the marginal propensity to tax, λ measures the relative importance of government
spending (g) and government debts (b) in determining optimal taxation. From 68), it is clear that
in the multivariate model RB might affect the relative importance of the two state variables on
the taxation function, while in the univariate model the relative importance of the two effects are
fixed in order to reduce the state space. (i.e., ht = bt+
1
(1+n)(R˜−ρg)gt+
(1−ρg)g
(1+n)(R˜−ρg)(R˜−1) .) We now
show that numerically the two modeling strategies can lead to the identical decision rules. Note
that in our univariate model, after introducing the new state variable, the consumption function
under RB can be written as
τt = MPTht, (70)
where we ignore the constant term; MPT =
(1+n)(R˜−1)
1−Σ , ht = bt +
1
(1+n)(R˜−ρg)gt, and Σ =
R˜ω2ζ/ (2ϑ). Figure 6 illustrates how the marginal propensity of taxation (MPT) is affected by
the degree of robustness in both the multivariate and univariate models when we set R˜ = 1.01,
n = 3%, ρg = 0.6, and ω
2
 = 1. The figure clearly shows that the two models deliver the identical
MPT for various values of ϑ. For example, the multivariate model predicts that
τt = 0.0182bt + 0.0444gt (71)
when 1/ϑ = 0.15, whereas the univariate model predicts that
τt = 0.0182ht = 0.0182 (bt + 2.4390gt) = 0.0182bt + 0.0444gt (72)
for the same value of ϑ (i.e., Σ = 0.4337). In addition, we find the relative importance of
government spending and government debt is also identical in the two models. (See Figure 7 for
an illustration.)
6.5 Deriving the Standard Errors for the VAR Test
In this appendix we derive expressions for the standard errors of the estimators for λ1 and λ2
used in the VAR test of Section 4.4. Let d ≡ 1
R˜
,
A ≡
[
a11 a12
a21 a22
]
,
and I be the 2× 2 identify matrix. Define
Λ ≡
[
λ1 λ2
]
= −
[
1 0
]
Ad (I − dA)−1 . (73)
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Define
B ≡ (I − dA)−1 =
[
b11 b12
b21 b22
]
,
we have B (I − dA) = I, and we can solve for the coefficients of the B matrix:
b11 =
1− da22
(1− da11) (1− da22)− d2a12a21 ,
b12 =
da12
(1− da11) (1− da22)− d2a12a21 ,
b21 =
da21
(1− da11) (1− da22)− d2a12a21 ,
b22 =
1− da11
(1− da11) (1− da22)− d2a12a21 .
Now we substitute the B matrix into Equation (73), obtaining
λ1 = −d a11 (1− da22) + da12a21
(1− da11) (1− da22)− d2a12a21 ≡ −d
c1
c2
,
λ2 = − da12
(1− da11) (1− da22)− d2a12a21 ≡ −
f1
f2
.
Let the 2×4 matrix G denote the gradient of Λ with respect to the vectorization of VAR coefficient
matrix A: vec(A) ≡
[
a11 a21 a12 a22
]T
, where G(i, j) = ∂λi∂vec(A)j (i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2, 3, 4) and
G is given by
G11 = − d
c2
(1− da22) (1− λ1) , G12 = −d
2a12
c2
(
1 + d
c1
c2
)
,
G13 = −d
2a21
c2
(
1 + d
c1
c2
)
, G14 =
d2
c2
(
a11 − c1
c2
(1− da11)
)
,
G21 =
d
f2
λ2 (1− da22) , G22 = d
2
f2
λ2a12,
G23 = − d
f2
(1− λ2da21) , G24 = d
f2
λ2 (1− da11) .
Finally, the covariance matrix of Λ is computed as
var (Λ) = G var (A)GT ,
where var (A) is the covariance matrix (4× 4) of vec (A).
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Figure 1: US Fiscal Policy
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Figure 2: The Relative Volatility of Tax Change to Government Spending
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Figure 3: The Correlation between the Government Deficit and Government Spending
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Figure 4: The Relative Volatility of Tax Change to Government Spending
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Figure 5: The Correlation between the Government Deficit and Government Spending
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Figure 6: The Equivalence between the Multivariate and Univariate Models
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Table 1: Key Moments on Relative Volatility and Correlation
Linear Filter HP Filter
sd(∆τ)
sd(∆g) 1.18(0.20) 1.18(0.20)
corr(def, g) 0.73(0.10) 0.56(0.11)
corr(def,∆g) 0.05(0.11) 0.05(0.11)
ρg 0.84(0.03) 0.52(0.09)
Table 2: Calibration Results
Variable Value
Σ 0.96
p 0.10
ρg 0.84
σ(g)
µ(g) 0.07
σ(ζ)
µ(g) 0.22
Table 3: Model Comparison (p = 0.1)
Data RE RB
sd(∆τ)
sd(∆g) 1.18 0.04 0.94
corr(def, g) 0.73 1.00 0.72
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Table 4: Calibration: Varying The Detection Error Probability
p = 0.10 p = 0.11 p = 0.12 p = 0.13 p = 0.14 p = 0.15
Σ 0.956 0.953 0.950 0.946 0.942 0.940
Table 5: Robust Check: Model Comparisons
Data RE RB RB RB RB RB
(p = 0.10) (p = 0.11) (p = 0.12) (p = 0.13) (p = 0.14) (p = 0.15)
sd(∆τ)
sd(∆g) 1.18 0.04 0.94 0.88 0.82 0.77 0.71 0.68
corr(def, g) 0.73 1.00 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.78
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Table 6: Results of the VAR Test
Model λ1 λ2 χ
2
W (2) p-value
RE 0.06(0.14) 0.42(0.15) 24.90 0.00
Σ = 0.1 0.06(0.13) 0.44(0.15) 23.60 0.00
Σ = 0.2 0.06(0.13) 0.47(0.15) 21.70 0.00
Σ = 0.3 0.06(0.13) 0.51(0.14) 19.25 0.00
Σ = 0.4 0.06(0.13) 0.54(0.14) 16.37 0.00
Σ = 0.5 0.06(0.13) 0.58(0.13) 13.32 0.00
Σ = 0.6 0.05(0.13) 0.62(0.13) 10.33 0.01
Σ = 0.7 0.04(0.13) 0.66(0.13) 7.65 0.02
Σ = 0.8 0.03(0.13) 0.70(0.13) 5.43 0.07
Σ = 0.9 0.02(0.14) 0.73(0.14) 3.74 0.15
Σ = 0.96 0.00(0.14) 0.75(0.14) 3.04 0.22
Note: χ2W (2) refers to the Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis test: λ1 = 0, λ2 = 1.
41
